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This chapter shows how the IoT ARM is perceived by the IoT community and how
the ARM can be placed in relation to existing IoT related standards and research
projects. The first sections of this chapter present reverse mappings of existing
standards and platforms to the IoT ARM and the last section of this chapter shows a
business case evaluation for an example use case in the healthcare domain.
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12.1 Introduction to Reverse Mapping
In the course of its own project roadmap, our sister project – the Internet of Things
Initiative (IoT-i) – has targeted three different (but connected) activities directly
relating to the IoT-A architecture work as shown below:
1. To review and categorise existing reference models having a connection to the
IoT field (or underlying disciplines, as IoT as such is more a technology
umbrella). Example of the reference models reviewed by IoT-i are ETSI
M2M, IETF Core, EPCglobal, Ucode and NFC to name just a few (IoT-A D1.2);
2. To put online a survey, the goal of which was to capture, people understanding
and expectation, as far as reference models are concerned. This exercise was
very important because people have generally different understanding about
what are reference models, architectures and what they should consist of;
3. Finally, to come back on reference models introduced and summarised in
previous versions of this deliverable and to do a reverse mapping exercise
towards the IoT Reference Model. The goal of this exercise was to show that
the reference model as defined by IoT-A is expressive enough in order to allow a
modelling of those (pre- IoT-A) existing IoT reference models using the IoT-A
one. In other words, if we would consider that IoT-A does not attempt to define
what is an IoT system using sentences and words, but defining models where any
IoT system (from the IoT understanding) shall fit, then all those existing
reference models would be IoT systems reference models.
In this Section we aim at giving some details about this reverse mapping exercise
applied to ETSI M2M, EPCglobal and uID. Some of the material in this
Section comes directly from the IoT-A D1.5 deliverable (Carrez et al. 2013)
(especially the UML figures and concept tables). In order to improve readability,
we do not use direct citations, although the work presented in the following
Section was performed by the IoT-A project and reported in their deliverable D1.5.
In addition to the standards that we have mentioned above, we also apply the IoT
Architectural Reference Model to a concrete architecture, namely the architecture
of the MUNICH (MUNICH 2010) project in order to validate the IoT ARM against
a real system in contrast to an abstract standard. Furthermore we show a reverse
mapping to the information model of the IoT-related research project BUTLER1.
12.2 Reverse Mapping ETSI M2M
Within the IoT-A D1.5 deliverable, Sect. 3.1.1 discusses the ETSI M2M standard
(ETSI TS 102 690). In this section we analyse the ETSI M2M standard. The
acronym ETSI stands for European Telecommunications Standards Institute
1 http://www.iot-butler.eu/
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(ETSI), viz. the standardisation body responsible for this standard. The acronym
M2M stands for Machine-to-Machine, which is a pointer to the application field this
standard addresses, viz. machine-to-machine communications. Release 1 of this
standard was published in October 2011 (ETSI TS 102 690), this discussion within
IoT-A also takes the later update (ETSI TS 103 092) into account that was released
in May 2012.
The purpose of the ETSI M2M functional architecture is to define a service-
capability layer which serves as middleware between applications in the Internet
and Devices or gateways residing in local-area networks. The current release is
mainly concerned with secure and reliable data transport.
In what follows, we give a more detailed description of a possible reverse
mapping of ETSI M2M to the IoT Domain Model and IoT Communication
Model as well as their management information model and how it maps to our
management model. We also have a brief look at the ETSI M2M security model and
how it compares to our threat analysis.
12.2.1 Mapping to the IoT Domain Model
As everything above the ETSI M2M Service Capability Layer is considered an
application, there is no explicit concept of a User in ETSI M2M. In particular,
Human Users are out of scope, as the standard focuses on machine-to-machine
communication. The role of an IoT-A User would typically be taken by ETSI
network applications, in some cases also by ETSI gateway applications, because
these applications use the information provided by sensing M2M Devices and
control the actuation capabilities of Devices.
ETSI M2M defines Sensors and Actuators in a similar way as the IoT Domain
Model. However, there is a subtle difference regarding the concept of a Device.
While in IoT-A there is a “is-a” relationship between Sensor/Actuator and Device,
ETSI M2M defines a Device to be a unit comprising Sensors and Actuators, as well
as embedded processing and communication capabilities – so here Sensors and
Actuators are part of Devices.
The ETSI M2M defines a Service Capability Layer with standardised interfaces.
Since this layer includes similar functionalities to the IoT-A Service level
(e.g. registration), it is reasonable to map these functionalities to IoT Services.
There are also some differences between ETSI and IoT-A terminology. For exam-
ple, the ETSI Services are not only exposed towards actors which IoT-A would
consider as Users, but also towards (ETSI) applications residing on Devices.
Additionally, the concept of IoT Resource (IoT-A) as a native software interface
of Devices does not explicitly exist in ETSI M2M – although software components
on legacy Devices could be considered as IoT Resources. Instead the term of
Resources in ETSI is exclusively used to describe the RESTful interface exposed
by the Service Capability Layer.
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The mapping of ETSI M2M concepts to the IoT Domain Model is shown in
Table 12.1.
As the current ETSI M2M release is rather concerned with data transport than
with real-world modelling, the (physical, virtual, augmented) entity concept is not
defined in (ETSI TS 103 092).
12.2.2 Mapping to the Management FG
Management functionalities are an inherent part of both of IoT-A and ETSI M2M.
Both architectures distribute and cluster the management functions into different
packages or functional components.
In (ETSI TS 102 690), the following packages are defined for management:
• General Management (GEN): Allows retrieving general information of the
M2M Device or gateway, and provides generic mechanism applicable to differ-
ent specific management functions;
• Configuration Management (CFG): Allows configuration of the device
capabilities and features for supporting M2M Services and applications, includ-
ing activating/deactivating device hardware components or I/Os in the M2M
Device or gateway;
• Diagnostic & Monitoring Management (D&M): Allows running specific diag-
nostic tests on a device and collecting the results or alerts from the M2M Device
or gateway. This package is also called Fault and Performance Management;




Device Device Sensors and Actuators are hosted on Devices, they are not
special cases of Devices
Sensor Sensor The Sensor in ETSI M2M is not a Device
Actuator Actuator The Actuator in ETSI M2M is not a Device
Network
application
User In ETSI M2M, there are no Human Users, but only applications
that process the data coming from the “Device and Gateway




User In ETSI M2M, there are no Human Users, but only applications
that process the data coming from the “Device and Gateway
Domain”. This concept of an application as a User is
reflected in IoT-A
Service Service In ETSI M2M, Services are not defined as exposing Resources
on Devices, but can interact with the Devices. A Resource
concept as in IoT-A does not exist
Resource Service Resources in ETSI M2M are defined in analogy to RESTful
Service Interfaces
282 E. Ho et al.
• Software/Firmware Management (SFW): Allows installation/update/removal of
application specific or SCL related software/firmware in M2M Device or
gateway;
• Area Network Management (ANW): Allows M2M Gateway-specific configura-
tion and M2M Area Network and Device management through a M2M gateway;
• SCL Management (SCL): Allows remote configuration and retrieval of M2M
Device or gateway service capability layer parameters.
In a similar fashion, Sect. 8.2.2 of this document identifies different Functional
Components used for management functionalities. These include:
• Configuration: Initialising the system configuration. Gathering and storing
configurations from FCs and Devices, tracking configuration changes;
• Fault: The goal of the Fault FC is to identify, isolate, correct and log faults that
occur in the IoT system;
• Member: This FC is responsible for the management of the membership and
associated information of any relevant entity (FG, FC, VE, IoT Service, Device,
Application, and User) to an IoT system;
• Reporting: The Reporting FC can be seen as an overlay for the other Manage-
ment FCs. It distils information provided by them. One of many conceivable
reporting goals is to determine the efficiency of the current system;
• State: The State FC monitors and predicts state of the IoT system. For a ready
diagnostic of the system, as required by Fault FC, the past, current and predicted
(future) state of the system are provided.
When mapping these different management components, it becomes obvious
once again that the focus of ETSI M2M is narrower in terms of its scope and
therefore it is more detailed in the definition of its management capabilities and
does not include all of the functionality defined by IoT-A. For instance, there is no
equivalent to State FC in terms of its temporal distribution and the related billing
capabilities. This aspect is not really central, as it is not contradictory and could be
built upon the D&M package. In general however there is a strong overlap, as D&M
roughly relates to the Reporting FC, CFG closely resembles Configuration, and
both D&M and Fault deal with monitoring functionalities. Error and fault handling
as such is handled specifically in the Fault FC, whereas D&M also handles
performance management. On the other hand, and in line with the general focus
of ETSI-M2M, the different aspects of the Configuration FC are handled in more
specific packages in ETSI M2M, such as SCL, ANW, and SFW which each deal
with specific functionalities that are subsumed under Configuration in IoT-A. As
the different architectures naturally have different levels of abstraction, it is not
surprising to not have a 1:1 relationship between the two architectures, but a
mapping can be performed easily in both directions.
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12.2.3 Mapping to the IoT Communication Model
The ETSI M2M standard defines a Service Capability Layer in order to enable
seamless, secure, and reliable end-to-end communication in M2M networks. The
ETSI Service Capability Layer can therefore be mapped to the end-to-end layer of
the IoT Communication Model (see Sect. 7.6). (ETSI) applications, communicating
via the Service Capability Layer, would accordingly be associated to the IoT-A
Data Layer (see Sect. 7.6.2), although they do not only exchange data, but also
control and management information.
A Network and ID group (see Sect. 7.6.2) is not in the focus of ETSI M2M, and
the current bindings to HTTP and CoAP do not assume such a layer. However, in
cases where the Service Capability Layer enables a direct connection of mobile
Device applications to network applications, an ID layer that describes the Device
independently from its network location could assist the Service Capability which
provides seamless connectivity. The three communication layers at the bottom of
Fig. 7.17 can be considered as identical in ETSI M2M and IoT-A.
From the point of view of ETSI M2M, all actors making use of the Service
Capability Layer are applications. The model distinguishes between device
applications, gateway applications, and network applications. ETSI M2M also
considers so-called legacy Devices; these are Devices that have no own Service
Capability Layer and therefore need to be integrated via a gateway application into
the M2M system (M2M system is a term implicitly used in ETSI M2M to refer to
the overall architecture).
The IoT-A term IoT Device is used more or less in the same way in ETSI M2M,
but the concept of an IoT Application does not directly exist in ETSI M2M – mainly
because the concept of an application is more broadly defined in ETSI M2M.
12.2.4 Mapping to the Security Model
One of the purposes of the ETSI M2M Service Capability Layer is to address all
security requirements of M2M communication. The standard defines a key hierar-
chy of three levels. The ETSI M2M Root Key is used for mutual authentication
between device or gateway nodes and the M2M Service Provider. It is also used for
deriving and agreeing on the key of the next layer of the hierarchy – the ETSI M2M
Connection Key which is used for every service connection procedure. Finally, the
ETSI M2M Application Key is used for securing sessions between specific
applications. This largely maps to the IoT-A Key exchange and management
functionality in IoT-A with respect to key management is not yet explicitly defined
in this document.
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Most of the communication security and Service security aspects of the IoT-A
security model are implicitly addressed in ETSI M2M – although the terminology
of IoT-A is not explicitly used. The ETSI M2M standard describes a range of
variants that depend on the security characteristics of the underlying network layers
and on the relationships between the M2M service provider and the network
operator. For example, if these stakeholders are identical, key provisioning can be
significantly simplified. One issue clearly not addressed in ETSI M2M are trust
models.
12.2.5 Threat Analysis Mapping
(ETSI TR 103 167) deals with a threat analysis related to the ETSI M2M standard.
In a similar way as the risk analysis provided in this document in Section.
[Chapter 6 Sect. 6.8] ETSI M2M defines those threats that are most relevant for
the standard, and discusses respective countermeasures. Here, the different focus of
ETSI M2M in terms of network security becomes obvious again, because most of
the threats identified by ETSI M2M deal with keys or message exchange. That
means that the scope of IoT-A is broader, as it also includes, for instance, Human
Users that do not behave correctly. Consequently, IoT-A refers to a general risk
analysis that includes by definition non-malicious behaviour that still imposes a risk
on the system. As the scope of IoT-A is broader, not all the risks identified within
IoT-A are applicable to ETSI M2M, but the threats of ETSI M2M map well to the
risks identified within Sect. 6.8. This is shown in Table 12.2 below.
As we can see in Table 12.2, there is a slight difference between both models
regarding the consequence or the cause of a risk, as ETSI M2M has a stronger focus
on what actions are actually applied in order to impose a risk on the system, whereas
IoT-A focuses more on the consequences of these actions. Nevertheless, there is a
good mapping between the two models. The granularity of ETSI M2M is naturally
higher, as it focuses on a more narrow class of threats.
12.2.6 Conclusion
If we consider that the aim of the ETSI M2M standard is to provide an M2M
architecture with a generic set of capabilities for M2M Services and to provide a
framework for developing Services independently of the underlying network, it
becomes clear that the scope of IoT-A is much broader, taking the entire Internet of
Things domain into account, esp. by explicitly modelling entities and also
providing a much more fine-grained set of relationships between the different
12 ARM Testimonials 285
Table 12.2 Mapping ETSI M2M threat analysis to the IoT-A risk analysis
ETSI M2M IoT-A
Threat 1: Discovery of long-term service-layer
keys stored in M2M devices or M2M
gateways
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 2: Deletion of long-term service-layer
keys stored in M2M devices or M2M
gateways
Disruption of a global Service
Threat 3: Replacement of long-term service-
layer keys stored in M2M devices or M2M
gateways
Disruption of a global Service
Threat 4: Discovery of long-term service-layer
keys stored in the SCs of the M2M core
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 5: Deletion of long-term service-layer
keys stored in the SCs of an M2M core
Disruption of a global Service
Threat 6: Discovery of long-term service-layer
keys stored in MSBF or MAS
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 7: Deletion of long-term service-layer
keys stored in the MSBF/MAS
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 8: Discover keys by eavesdropping on
communications between entities
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 9: Modification of data stored in the M2M
service capabilities
Alteration of the return value upon service
invocation
Attacker alters leaf-device content so that a
user will eventually be redirected to a
malicious content
Attacker alter sensor device so that monitoring
of a Physical Entity fails
Threat 10: Provisioning of non-legitimate keys Disruption of a global Service
Threat 11: Unauthorised or corrupted application
and service-layer software in M2M
Attacker impersonates infrastructure Services,
compromising IoT functionalities and/or
other dependent infrastructure services
Threat 12: Subverting the M2M device/gateway
integrity-checking procedures
Alteration of the invocation of a Service
Threat 13: Unauthorised or corrupted software in
M2M core
Attacker impersonates infrastructure Services,
compromising IoT functionalities and/or
other dependent infrastructure services
Threat 14: Subverting the integrity-checking
procedures in the M2M core
Alteration of the invocation of a Service
Threat 15: General eavesdropping on M2M
service-layer messaging between entities
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
(continued)
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kinds of devices, resources and services. While ETSI M2M makes different
assumptions, especially in terms of security and communication, the basic concepts
are somewhat compatible, at least on an abstract level of discussion. The major
difference is that IoT-A is based on the assumption that the IoT Device space can be
divided into the two main categories of constrained networks (NTU) and uncon-
strained networks (NTC), and the security measurements mainly need to address
the boundaries between them, whereas ETSI focusses so far on the M2M Service
Layer and its interfaces (ETSI TR 103 167) and not on the M2M Area Network
Layer, so that IoT-A has a more network centred view of security than ETSI M2M.
That being said, the functionalities discussed in Sect. 6.8 largely represent in (ETSI
TR 103 167; Sect. 10.2), so that a mapping is feasible on the same abstraction level
as the IoT Domain Model can be mapped to the ETSI M2M Service Capability
Layer.
12.3 Reverse Mapping EPCglobal
The EPCglobal high-level architecture was introduced briefly in D1.5 deliverable
of the IoT-i project (Haller 2012) Figure 12.1 gives a simplified view of the
EPCglobal system architecture, taken from [EPCglobal]. It is worth noting that




Threat 16: Alteration of M2M service-layer
messaging between entities
Alteration of the invocation of a Service
Threat 17: Replay of M2M service-layer mes-
saging between entities
Compromised intermediary devices alter tra-
versing data
Alteration of the invocation of a Service
Threat 18: Breach of privacy due to inter-
application communications
User is involved in transactions with a mali-
cious peer
Attacker gains knowledge of user private
parameters
Threat 19: Breach of privacy due to attacks on
M2M device/gateway service capabilities
User is involved in transactions with a mali-
cious peer
Attacker gains knowledge of user private
parameters
Threat 20: Discovery of M2M long-term service-
layer keys from knowledge of access-
network keys
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
Threat 21: Transfer of module containing access-
network keys and/or M2M long-term keys to
a different terminal/device/gateway
Attacker gains knowledge of sensitive
exchanged data
Disclosure of identities and cryptographic
material
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12.3.1 Mapping to the Domain Model
In the EPCglobal architecture, the unique identifier associated with a physical
object is the Electronic Product Code (EPC). It is defined by the EPCglobal Tag
Data Standard, which defines its structure and encoding rules. Uniqueness of
encoding structure (in order to avoid name collisions) is ensured by the use of a
central Registration Authority.
The EPC Network Services in Fig. 12.1 are under the responsibility of the
EPCglobal central authority and they are responsible for respectively providing
discovery service to EPCglobal parties (end-users). The Object Naming Service




























Discovery i/f Discovery i/f
RFID Tag
Fig. 12.1 EPCglobal system architecture (simplified)
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since it is the one allocating the EPC blocks. Local ONS are under the responsibility
of the EPC manager (one per registered end-user).
After getting the address of an Electronic Product Code Information Service
(EPCIS) responsible for the EPC of interest, an EPCIS Accessing Application will
use the EPCIS query interface (i/f) to query additional information about an EPC
(like class level/instance level or transactional data about a particular EPC). EPCIS
query interface uses both push and pull mode, which means that it can be also used
to receive notifications of observations concerning a particular EPC.
EPCIS Repository is the functional block, located at the “end-user A” side, deals
with storage of information (of any nature) it wants to share with other parties
(e.g. end-user B) of the EPC Global network. Of course all interfaces have to be
implemented following the EPCglobal standards, however a certain level of free-
dom is left to “end-users” as for how those block shall be implemented.
The ONS block is a simple look-up Service that will map an EPC to the address
of a designated EPCIS Service by which information about the EPC can be found.
The Filtering & Collection functional block is responsible for collecting raw tag
data following policies defined by the EPCIS Capturing Application box. Example
of such policy is: gathering all EPC of a certain class that have been read on a
certain date, location and time interval.
The EPCIS Capturing Application supervises the operation at the lower level of
the model and provides business context by coordinating with other components
involved in a given business process. Again, a lot of freedom is left to the end-user
for implementing this box, as far as the Application Level Event (ALE i/f) and
capturing i/f are implemented according to the EPCglobal standards.
To finish up with the lower level, the Data Capture Device box (Tag Reader) is
the one observing events relating to RFID Tags. The corresponding Reader i/f
provides those events to the Filtering & Collection box.
The purpose of the reverse mapping is to check if the EPCglobal architecture is
compatible with the IoT Reference Model.
The EPCglobal architecture illustrated in Fig. 12.1 is not exactly an EPCglobal
domain model (as we understand IoT Domain Model in IoT-A), but rather a high-
level diagram of a concrete architecture. Because the two models are not exactly
similar in nature (i.e. IoT Domain Model is clearly at the “concept” level while the
EPCglobal is a high level system architecture description) the reverse mapping of
the EPCglobal architecture towards the IoT Domain Model is not a straightforward
or simple process.
So in the following we use the EPCglobal system architecture in order to extract
the EPCglobal concepts and then build an EPCglobal domain model taking a basis
the generic IoT DM (meaning we try linking the EPCglobal concepts using the IoT
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DM relationships, and try mapping the EPCglobal concepts to the IoT-A concepts)
Nevertheless, we still executed to reverse mapping by building an EPCglobal
domain model taking a basis the generic IoT DM (meaning we linked the





Entity Physical entity Is the Physical object been tracked by the EPCglobal
system
End-user User The user managing and using the EPCIS, and reading the
EPC
Partner user User The user willing to access EPC information for their own
business
Physical entity Physical entity
(special case
of)





Places, room, lift,. . .
RFID tag Tag The physical tag embedding the EPC
Tag reader Device/Sensor
Reader interface Service




User Located at end-user side that is willing to access EPC
related information
EPCIS service Service Service that encompasses interfaces for data exchange
(through the EPCIS Query Interface e.g.) and specifi-
cation of Data (EPCIS data standard)
EPCIS query
interface







Service/Resource Exposes the EPCIS Query Interface. Stores info about
EPCs events. . .The actual functionality of storing
(e.g. in a data base) could/should be modelled as a
Resource whereas the component that exposes the
interface would be a Service. Of course that could be
implemented tightly coupled as one software
component
EPC record Virtual entity Consists of all info related to EPC (stored in EPC Data
Base)
EPC data base Network resource
EPCIS capturing
application
Service Exposes the EPCIS capture interface
Filtering &
collection
Service/Resource Exposes the filtering and collection interface. Collects tag
reads over time intervals constrained by events defi-
nition by the EPCIS Capturing Application. Filtering
functionality may be modelled as a Resource, whereas
exposing the interface as a Service
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EPCglobal concepts using the IoT DM relationships, and mapped the EPCglobal
concepts to the IoT-A concepts).
First we identified a list of concepts that can be extracted from the EPCglobal
system architecture and mapped them to the corresponding IoT DM concepts. This
mapping is illustrated in Table 12.3.
Then according to the IoT Domain Model, the kind of concepts it handles and
how those concepts are connected through relationships, the following (see
Fig. 12.2) and consistent UML EPCglobal domain model could be extracted. As
it fits the IoT Domain Model framework it can be argued that EPCglobal fits the IoT
Fig. 12.2 EPCglobal domain model fit into the IoT Domain Model
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Domain Model and that EPCglobal is truly an IoT system from the IoT-A definition
point of view.
However, during this reverse mapping exercise IoT-A raised few comments:
1. Difficulties to model interfaces in general, as interfaces are not part of the IoT
Domain Model in IoT-A. But it can also be argued that “interface” is purely a
software concept which makes great sense in an architecture but making no sense
at the concept level (i.e. in a domain model). Again this can be due to the fact that
they (IoT-A) tried to fit somehow a system architecture into a domain model;
2. EPCglobal does not emphasise the need for Augmented Entities. They are
therefore not part of the model;
3. Difficulties to model that a User can be responsible for managing a Tag (there-
fore End-user has not been included in the model);
4. There is a need for introducing end-users formally in the model with roles. It
must be possible to express the fact that end-users with management role can
associate information to a tag for instance.
5. It should be possible to express the fact that User can discover Services, that
Services can discover Resources, that Resources can discover Resources (to be
discussed which combinations make most sense);
6. Some links between IoT Domain Model and IoT Information Model should be
explicitly described within the IoT Domain Model, like “*-description
publishing”
7. Discovery and publishing are important concepts in IoT they should be very
visible in the IoT Domain model as said in 7/ and 8/
8. We don’t show here the reverse mapping to the IoT Information model, but it
was pretty clear that the IoT Information Model is a meta-model that cannot
really be used to model the class structure of the EPCglobal data handled at the
different levels in the architecture (e.g. at Tag level, reader level, Filtering &
Collection etc.. . .), in particular the IoT Information Model does not consider
events (and EPCglobal is intensively using the notion of event). We reckon that
most likely this is not the role of the IoT Information Model to model in a fine-
grained way the class structure of a software system, especially when the class
structure is clearly not IoT-specific.
12.3.2 Mapping to Information Model
As far as information is concerned, the main input in the EPCglobal reference
architecture is the description of the EPC Information Service and the description of
data the end user can share through the EPCIS interface.
EPCIS data within a so-called EPCIS record can be divided in several categories
as follows2 (see also Table 12.4):
2 Excerpt from the EPCglobal Architecture document.
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• Static Data: class level and instance level data, which do not change over time
during the physical object life span
– Class Level Data: there remain identical to any object which is an instance of
that class
– Instance-Level Data: the data may vary within objects instance of a class.
Typical examples are lot number, expiry date, number within a lot, S/N
etc.. . .
• Transactional Data: which changes and grows over the physical object life
span, possibly created by more than one actor along a supply chain for instance:
– Instance observation: it records events concerning the Physical Objects and
often relates to dimensions like time, location, other EPC, and business
process steps
– Quantity observation: records events concerned with measuring the quan-
tity of objects within a particular class. Five dimensions: time, location,
object class, quantity, business step.
– Business Transaction Observation: records association between one or
more EPC and a business transaction. Four dimensions time, one or more
EPCs, business process step, business transaction id.
12.3.3 Security Model
As explained in the EPCglobal Architecture Framework document [EPCglobal],
the EPCglobal Architecture Framework allows for many different authentication
technologies across the different interfaces. It is however recommended in the
EPCglobal architecture document, that the X.509 certificate-based method should





RFID tag Device/Tag Virtual entity representing RFID tag associated with the Phys-
ical Entity
EPC Virtual entity Electronic product code. It is encoded on the RFID tag
EPCIS event Value Might be just a wrapping of IPCIS data in the form of an
event. . .
EPCIS data Value Is the data associated with the Physical Object and therefore
contained in the EPCIS Virtual Entity
EPC record Virtual entity Consists of all info related to Physical Object identified by EPC
(stored in EPCIS Data Base), i.e. IPCIS Data
EPCIS static
data
Value Contains class level Data and Instance level Data
EPCIS transac-
tional data
Value Relates to observations (instances, quantity within a class)
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be used by end-users when accessing the EPCIS interface for example. Typical case
occurs when the EPCIS Accessing Application of an accessing end-user (referred as
Partner user in the architecture framework) is willing to access the EPCIS service of
the primary end-user (the one owning the EPCIS data for instance). If used the
X.509 certificates are expected to comply with the X.509 Certificate Profile
[Cert1.0] which provide minimum level of security.
At the network level some network standards within EPCglobal rely on Trans-
port Layer Security (TSL), some others EPCglobal standards rely on HTTPS
(HTTP over TLS) for the purpose of Data protection.
At higher level both EPCIS Capturing I/f and EPCIS Query i/f standards are
allowing authentication of client’s identity so that companies (owners of the data)
can decide very precisely whether access to that data can be granted or denied. For
the query interface, Applicability Statement 2 (AS2) is used for communication
with external partners. This RFC (4130) specifies how to securely transport data
over Internet and allows in particular for mutual authentication, data confidentiality
and integrity and non-repudiation. Those security qualities are required in the
ARM. AS2 uses x.509 certificate as defined above.
The high level interface (AuthX) used for Authentication in the ARM Security
Model does authorise for the use of X.509 certificates.
12.4 Reverse Mapping Ucode
The Ubiquitous ID (uID) architecture is an architecture proposed by Prof.
Sakamura (from the University of Tokyo) (Koshizuka, Sakamura 2010) to imple-
ment the concept of Ubiquitous Computing (ubicomp). Ubiquitous computing is a
paradigm coined initially by Mark Weiser in the late 80s (see Weiser 1991). It
touches many aspects of computing, like OS’s, displays, intelligent user interfaces,
wireless communication and networking. In the vision of ubicomp, the computer as
we use to know it today, has mostly (if not totally) disappeared. It has become
invisible and ambient. While IoT as such is not ubicomp (for instance intelligent
user interfaces are not clearly part of IoT field) it can be argued that IoT offers
means for implementing partly the ubicomp concept, spreading intelligence among
objects of extremely different natures, enabling for cooperation between objects
and humans and creating awareness about the surrounding (Context awareness) in a
fully connected environment.
The intelligent features or Services implemented through this paradigm can be
enabled only if information about the objects, places, Devices, etc. is available to
those Services. We therefore talk about “intelligent” “smart” or more specifically
“context-aware” Services. This only works if those objects, places, Devices of
interest can be uniquely identified at any point in time. The uID architecture relies
on an identification technique called ucode (ubiquitous code) which can be consid-
ered as the cornerstone of the uID architecture. The ucode model is a descriptive
technique that establishes relationships between Physical and Virtual Entities
through relationships between ucodes.
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The basic principles of the uID architecture consist of uniquely identifying
entities of interest with ucodes, maintaining databases that contain information
about the entities, ensuring data and privacy protection and opening this platform
through open APIs.
In order to enable those principles fundamental technologies and mechanisms
such as ucode structure, ucode tag, ucode readers and terminals, ucode relational
databases managing the entities information and ucode information servers are used.
These different components are detailed in the following subsections. The simplified
architecture shown in Fig. 12.3 is taken from (Koshizuka, Sakamura 2010).
12.4.1 uCode Model
In the ucode model [UID Architecture], unique identifiers are assigned to:
• Objects: tangible objects of the real world (industrial product, piece of art,
everyday objects,..) as well as intangible ones like pieces of digital media or
source code;
• Spaces: monuments, streets, etc.
• Concepts: relationships between objects and spaces of the real world, which are
also named “entities”. Those relationships are used to define complex context
information, and are defined using a description framework called ucode Rela-
tion (ucR) model. Simple context information relates to objects and places
directly.
It is worth noting that the uniquely assigned code does not contain any informa-
tion about the entity. Relevant information about the tagged entity is stored in an
application Information Service which can be located by resolving the ucode. A
distinction is made between physical ucode which are by definition stored in a Tag
attached to the entity, and logical ucode which are not stored in any Tag and are
mainly used for identifying intangible objects as described above (including
relationships between ucodes).
The main idea behind allocating ucode to relationships between entities comes












Fig. 12.3 Ubiquitous ID
architecture
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is made of triple<subject, relation, object> where each constituent of the triple is
made of a URI. In the case of ucode relationship each ucR unit is a triple of ucodes.
Information associated with the two entities and the relation can therefore be found
querying the ucode resolution server.
In addition resulting from this establishment of relations between entities, are
graphs (ucR graph) where single “subject” ucode gets linked to many “object”
ucode via various “relations”. Objects which are not ucodes are called “atoms”. A
subject ucode pointing via a relation towards a URL is a typical example of such
rules involving atoms.
12.4.2 ucode Resolution Server
The resolution of ucode is achieved in the ucode Resolution Server The simplified
resolution consists of taking the ucode read by the reader, searching for ucR units
that correspond to that ucode and returning to the mobile terminal the addresses of
content associated with the ucode via the relational database introduced earlier
(similar to a triple store).
The Ubiquitous ID architecture can be simply described as follows (Fig. 12.3):
From the descriptions of the various entities of the architecture (see Fig. 12.3)
above, the following table of concepts could be derived (Table 12.5):
In turn, the reverse mapping produced the following UML (see Fig. 12.4) below:
The uID architecture uses the uCR to describe complex context information via
relationships between real-world entities (Koshizuka, Sakamura 2010). So-called
uCR units consist of a triple of ucodes: subject ucode, relation ucode, and object
ucode. The object ucode can be replaced by simple literals, hence it becomes
possible to express attributes of a real-world entity as a uCR unit, e.g., <ucode X,
“hasBrandName”, “GoldenTea”>.
It is not feasible to try to map the uCR model directly to IoT Information Model.
The IoT Information Model provides a vocabulary for describing IoT systems and it
does not, explicitly prescribe how information should be represented. The uCR, on
the other hand, can be used to represent relations between any kinds of objects
identified with ucodes much in the same way as RDF is used to represent resources
identified with URIs. Therefore, the relation between IoT-A information model and
the uCR model is actually complementary by nature and the uCR should be seen as
a an alternative way (for XML, RDF, binary etc.) to represent IoT Information
Model concepts.
12.4.3 Conclusion
To conclude, when mapped to the generic IoT-A the uID provides implementations
for only a small subset of the functionalities defined in IoT ARM. First, the ucode
provides a globally unique way identify physical (and virtual) objects. These
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ucodes can be used as identifiers for any instance of the IoT ARM concept. Second,
the uID provides a way to resolve the address of the information service hosting
data about the object identified with a ucode. This functionality is basically a subset
of the functionality defined for the IoT-A resolution infrastructure. Third, the uID
provides methods (i.e. the ucode Relational Model) for representing relations




Tangible object Physical entity
Intangible object Digital artefact If the intangible object is a representation of a tangible
object, then it is also a Virtual Entity
Location Physical entity Location is not modelled explicitly in the IoT Domain
Model. However, a specific (possibly tagged) place
can be regarded as a Physical Entity
uCR model Relates to informa-
tion model
uCR can be used for representing IoT-A Information
Model instances
ucode No direct relation The ucode can be used as an globally unique identifier

















































Service Provides infrastructure and application services
ucode tag Tag
User terminal (Device) Is a device that reads ucodes and provides services based
on the ucode to a user. A user terminal that is just
used to run an application or display some informa-
tion is not in the scope of the IoT Domain Model.
However, a user terminal containing a reader is in the
terms of the IoT Domain Model a Device with an
embedded Sensor Device
Reader Device/Sensor
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between ucodes. This functionality can be used for representing IoT Information
Model concepts.
12.5 Reverse Mapping BUTLER Information Model
12.5.1 Introduction
BUTLER’s mission is to provide context-aware services within an IoT environ-
ment3. What is really striking about that is that there does not seem to be an explicit
and widely accepted definition of what context-awareness really means. Although
an intuitive definition of what context means can be found easily (“the conditions
and circumstances that are relevant to an event, fact, etc.”) (Dey 2001), a more
formal definition is needed. If we look at other projects within the FP7 umbrella, we
can see what FI-WARE4 provides – a data/context management section. Although
not straightforward, it states that “Context [..] is represented through context
elements” and that these elements “are typically created containing the value of
attributes characterising a given entity at a given moment”. Therefore, we can state
that the context “characterises a given entity at a given moment”. That definition
gives rise to a discussion of what an entity is and the extent to which
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Fig. 12.4 uID architecture fit into the IoT Domain Model
3 http://www.iot-butler.eu/
4 FI-WARE (http://www.fi-ware.eu/) is a European FP7 Research Project aiming to foster the
emerging Future Internet by creating an open architecture and a reference implementation of a
novel service infrastructure, building upon generic and reusable building blocks developed in
earlier research projects.
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12.5.2 Reverse Mapping of IoT Domain Model
With regard to the first issue, the IoT-A Domain Model (IoT-A DM) fits perfectly
within such a definition, as it introduces the concept of Virtual Entity. These Virtual
Entities are the main concept handled by the IoT-A model since they represent the
entities in the real world that designers of IoT applications consider relevant. The
remaining main concepts introduced by the IoT-A DM (Resources and Services)
are naturally associated to the Virtual Entities. A straightforward conclusion is that
context should also be “associated” to Virtual Entities. However, the IoT-A DM
does not explicitly consider the context. This is irrelevant; we will return to this
issue later.
The second issue (what the context means for a given entity) is actually related to
the deployment and implementation of a given IoT scenario and not to the definition
of the model. However, it is worth mentioning that the components of the context
(the “context elements” mentioned by FI-WARE) are totally dependent on the
needs and requirements of the consumers of the functionality exposed by entities
(again, in a specific scenario). In BUTLER, we introduce a model in which, given a
Virtual Entity, it is possible for the consumer of the functionality (usually an
application developer) to define at any time the relevant context for this entity.
This type of context declaration operation defines the context elements and the data
sources these context elements will depend on. It is also important to acknowledge
that a given entity context relies not only on the information that devices can gather
about it but also (and sometimes mainly) on dynamic data sources that are not
actually “device-originated”.
BUTLER has taken the IoT-A DM as its main inspiration. However, it has been
simplified somewhat to increase the readability and clarity of the model. For
instance, the Augmented Entity is not considered; Digital Artefacts – and therefore
a non-Human User – have been removed as well; Network Resources have been
also dismissed and therefore, the BUTLER model contemplates only On-Device
Resources. UML has been used to illustrate the model graphically similarly to the
way the IoT-A DM does. We will highlight the main differences and additions we
have considered.
The relationship between Users, Physical and Virtual Entities is almost identical
to the ones suggested by the IoT-A DM. Besides the simplification already men-
tioned, it is worth noting that the BUTLER Domain Model introduces additional
relationships that are not expressed by the IoT-A DM. For instance, there can be
additional relationships between Users and Physical Entities. The most obvious is
the “ownership” (or at least entitlement to the management of the Physical Entity).
The relevance of this relationship relies on the access permissions it derives (that is,
the owner of a house will have the “right” to get information about his home and to
adjust the desired temperature, while a stranger will not, at least not until the owner
gives him the right to). On the other hand, the BUTLER Domain Model introduces
the BUTLER terminology and therefore, instead of talking about Devices, we
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introduce the Smart Object concept, which is equivalent to the Device concept
within the IoT-A DM (Fig. 12.5).
As with the IoT-A DM, Resources are introduced to bridge the gap between the
Virtual Entities and the Smart Objects, enabling the monitoring and manipulation of
Physical Entities from the digital world. Resources are the software components
that actually provide information about, or enable the actuation on Physical
Entities. BUTLER simplifies the management of Resources, focusing on On-
Device Resources (those deployed locally on the Smart Object attached to the





































Fig. 12.5 Relationships between users, physical and virtual entities
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provide sensing data, or actuator Resources). It is possible to model other Resources
deployed externally to Smart Objects that run somewhere in the network as generic
Network Resources. These Resources can process data, for example, taking sensor
information as input and generating aggregated or higher-level information as
output (for instance, a dynamic data source providing dynamic weather forecasts
or energy consumption estimates). Also, Network Resources can be storage
Resources storing information coming from On-Device Resources and thus provide
information about Physical Entities (i.e. location and state-tracking information
(history), static data, such as product type information, and many other properties).
Other external data sources, even Human Users, can also update the information in
a storage Resource (Fig. 12.6).
The primary relationship between Physical Entities and their digital















































Fig. 12.6 Introduction of the resource concept and its relationship to devices and physical entities
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Resources they host on the other, is achieved by means of associations. Therefore,
Users are enabled to act on or to know about Physical Entities by means of the
associations between Virtual Entities and Resources. For each Virtual Entity there
can be associations with different Resources that may provide different
functionalities, such as retrieving information or enabling the execution of
actuation tasks on the Virtual Entities. When a User wishes to acquire information
about or to actuate on a given Physical Entity, she would perform a discovery
process determining which Resources associated to the Virtual Entities representing
the Physical Entities enable actuation or data access. Next, the User would pick up
the Resources that match her requirements and invoke them. However, it is unlikely
that the User would directly invoke Resources. She would do it instead through a
Service or application that accesses Resources to perform its business logic.
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that both Smart Objects and Users can be
modelled as a Physical Entity. The same may happen with Smart Mobiles (the client
device used by users in the BUTLER terminology) (Fig. 12.7).
Here we can see a main divergence from the IoT-A DM, since that model
introduces an explicit relationship between Services and Virtual Entities. Although
the nature of the relationship is not explicit in the model, the IoT-A Information
Model offers additional information about what such a relationship looks like: the
Virtual Entity attributes are used to associate Services to Virtual Entities. We prefer
a model in which the context is made explicit in the BUTLER Domain Model (and
not disguised as the Virtual Entity attributes).
As described in the initial section of this chapter when describing the FI-WARE
data/context, the context elements are associated to the entities the system handles.
BUTLER proposes to associate Contexts to Virtual Entities. Therefore, it will be
possible to handle the context of the Physical Entities represented by the Virtual
Entities the Context is associated to. On the other hand, several Contexts can be
associated to a given Virtual Entity just to reflect the fact that different “consumers”
will have a different need or view of the context associated to a given entity
(Fig. 12.8).
On the other hand, the attributes of Contexts in BUTLER will be mostly created
from data obtained from Resources. Each attribute will be the result of an operation
executed over data elements from one or several Resources. Such Resources may or
may not be associated to the Virtual Entity the Context is associated to (Fig. 12.9).5
Finally, Services will be entitled to use not only low-level Resources when they
need to know about the status of Physical Entities, but also richer Contexts
(Fig. 12.10).
5 For instance, the context associated to a house can include the outdoor temperature. This
temperature value can be exposed through a Resource associated to the Weather Service, which
in turn has also been modeled as a Virtual Entity. Although the Resource exposing the temperature
is not associated to the Virtual Entity representing the given house, an element of its context relies
on this “external” Resource.
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12.6 Reverse Mapping MUNICH Platform
The goal of reverse mapping an existing system towards the IoT Reference Model
is to show that an existing system that has been designed without applying the IoT
ARM can be redesigned according to the IoT ARM. By doing so the IoT ARM
shows its potential for being a reference model for any kind of IoT systems.
12.6.1 Use Case Description
The use case is about counting “stomach towels” which are used inside the
abdomen during surgery of a human. After the operation it needs to be assured
that no towels are retained in the abdominal cavity of the patient’s body. Therefore,
























































Fig. 12.7 Users to service/resource relationship
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before, during, and after the surgery. The RFID-tagged towels may be tracked by
three antennas from different positions in the operating theatre:
• Mayo stand (instrument table): towel is unused;
• Operation table: towel is in use;
• Used towel container: towel is used
Each towel will be used in a specific order: First a batch of “unused” stomach
towels resides on the instrument table. Towels that are put into the abdominal cavity
are declared as “in use”. Finally, towels that are not needed anymore after the
surgery are put into the towel container where their status is set to “used”.
Every time an RFID reader recognises a tagged towel appearing or disappearing






























































Fig. 12.8 Context to virtual entity relationship
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12.6.2 Use Case Objective
It must be assured that no towels are left inside the patient’s abdomen when
the operation has finished. In more technical terms it means that after finishing
the operation all the towels that were “in use” must be in state “used” meaning
in the used towel container.
12.6.3 Current System Architecture
So far the use case has been designed to run with a certain type of RFID-readers
only that are connected via USB-cable to a laptop computer that is hosting the
application. The MUNICH-platform (MUNICH 2010) depicted in Fig. 12.11
provides a cloud storage system indicated as ‘Open Nebula Core’ that stores the

































































Fig. 12.9 Context to resource relationship
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number of towels in their respective range by invoking the ‘Event Service’. The
application that monitors the status of the towels during the operation invokes
methods provided by the ‘Operation Theatre Service’. The API to store and retrieve
information from and to the cloud storage system is technology-specific. If an
architect decides at a later point in time to change from Open Nebula to another
technology the system needs to be adapted to the changes in the API.
12.6.4 Enhancement by Using IoT Reference Architectural
Model
Making the use case demonstrator IoT-A conform means making the system more
evolvable and future-proof. By using RFID reader services a technology agnostic
layer is introduced that is not so much dependent on today’s lifecycle of






































































Fig. 12.10 Service to context relationship
306 E. Ho et al.
new type of RFID reader needs to replace a current one. Also extending the use case
with another RFID reader or another type of sensor will be much easier once IoT-A
is applied. Thus the IoT ARM contributes towards scalability in this use case too.
The restriction in evolvability applies to the cloud storage component too since the
current system is designed to be used with certain cloud storage software. It is not
Fig. 12.11 Current architecture of MUNICH platform (MUNICH 2010)
12 ARM Testimonials 307
easy to substitute the component in case the software is discontinued or no longer
appropriate. In case the services are modelled according to technology agnostic
IoT-A specifications the system will be more future proof. In order to make the use
case IoT-A-compliant, the following architectural process will be undertaken.
1. Specification of Business Process Model;
2. Specification of Domain Model;
3. Specification of Information Model;
4. Specification of Functional View;
5. Specification of Services and Interactions between components.
12.6.5 Specification of IoT Business Process Model
The use case has been formalised as IoT Business Process Model by a domain
expert in Fig. 12.12. The modelling notation used is described in (Meyer
et al. 2011). The operation scenario is a sub-process of the overall Emergency
operation process that may include the arrival of the patient via ambulance and the
availability of data record for the patient in the hospital’s data base. The towels
being used during the surgery are associated to the patient identified in the database
record. This way it is possible to verify which towels have been used for which
patient. The towels are the entities of interest (depicted by the box with the cow
icon) in this scenario. The RFID reading processes are running in parallel on all
three positions in the operating theatre that are equipped with the RFID readers. The
used towel container is denoted as waste bin in Fig. 12.12. Each RFID reader
sub-process sends events to the Event History database upon detection of tagged
towels. The ‘Monitor towel process’ analyses the events that have arrived in the
database, determines the current state for each towel, and calculates the number of
towels that are currently inside the body of the patient.
12.6.6 Specification of IoT Domain Model
Based on the Business Process Model presented before, a domain model can be
derived that identifies the Physical and Virtual Entities, the IoT Services, the
Devices, Resources, and the users that are involved in the use case. The Human
User is the doctor or other medical staff who is responsible to monitor the towels in
the operation theatre. The actual monitoring of the towels by comparing the used
towels with the ones currently in use is done by software implementing the
‘Monitor towel process’ as depicted in Fig. 12.12. The User checks only that no
towels are still in use when the operation is about to end. The software ‘Operation
Theatre Application’ is modelled as Active Digital Artefact. Each towel is a
Physical Entity that has one RFID tag attached so that the number of towels
corresponds to the number of tags. Each physical towel has a digital counterpart
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Fig. 12.12 IoT business process model of MUNICH use case
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modelled as Virtual Entity. There are three RFID readers deployed in the scenario
at different significant locations of the operation theatre (Instrument Table, Opera-
tion Table, and Waste Bin) that are modelled as Sensor Devices. Each of the
Sensors hosts an OnDevice Resource that is exposed by an ‘Object Inventory
Service’ as depicted in Fig. 12.11. These services store events by invoking the
‘Event Storage Service’ that exposes the Network Resource ‘Event History’. This
Resource is also exposed to the ‘Operation Theatre Application’ by the Event
History (Fig. 12.13).
12.6.7 Specification of Functional View
The realisation of the use case according to the IoT ARM a Functional View is
tailored to the use case needs to be specified. The Functional View for the MUNICH
platform is depicted in Fig. 12.14. No IoT Service Resolution is required, because
all needed services are already known to the system at design time. A VE Resolu-
tion FC is included in the FV. This FC is able to resolve particular towels to the IoT
Fig. 12.13 Domain model of MUNICH platform
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Service they are currently associated with. The ‘VE & IoT Service Monitoring’ FC
is used to update the current state of towels whenever these VEs change their
position in the operating theatre. Whenever VEs change their positions their
associations between the VEs and the IoT Services reading the RFID tags change
too. No Service Organisation functions are required in this use case since the
binding of services is static and can therefore be hardwired. To accommodate IoT
Business Process Management functionality that is required in the MUNICH
platform the respective FG is included in the FV. The process model diagram
depicted in Fig. 12.12 was created by the ‘Process Modelling’ FC and this model
is executed by the ‘Process Execution’ FC. The Functional View of the MUNICH
platform includes IoT Services for the RFID readers and for Event Storage
Resources. The Application in the FV is the use case as described the beginning
of this Section. The Devices are the RFID readers and Tags used in the operational
theatre which communicate to the IoT Services by ‘End To End Communication’
and ‘Network Communication’ FCs. The entire FV is depicted in Fig. 12.14.
12.6.8 Specification of IoT Information Model
The IoT Information Model specified for this use case also addresses relationships
between entities that are not depicted in the IoT Domain Model before. Some more
entities appear in the IoT Business Process Model shown before in Fig. 12.12. For
instance it is depicted that an ‘Operation’ is held for a ‘Patient’ and thus the
‘PatientIdentifier’ (valid in the clinic) is assigned to an ‘Operation’. Operations
are processes with a defined status at any point in time: ‘before’, ‘in’, and ‘after
Operation’. There is also an unknown status in case the status cannot be obtained.
The towels are represented as VEs with domain attributes that are essential for the
use case. The towel’s identifier stored into a RFID tag is one of the attributes as well
as the current state of a towel that can be one of ‘unused’, ‘in use’, and ‘used’. Again
there is an ‘unknown’ state specified in case the state cannot be obtained by the
system. The aforementioned designated locations of the operating theatre are
reflected in the Information Model as attributes of the VE ‘Towel’. For simplifica-
tion the allowed values for this attribute {InstrumentTable; OperationTable;
WasteBin; unknown} are not visualised as ValueContainer. With the aforemen-
tioned attribute values the OperationTheatreApplication is able to relate the current
location of the towels (retrieved through the RFID readers) to the respective state of
the towel: {instrument table ¼ ‘unused’; operation table ¼ ‘in use’; waste bin ¼
‘used’} (Fig. 12.15).
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12.6.9 Specification of IoT Services and Interactions
In the following an example description is given for one of the three ‘Object
Inventory Services’ specified in the IoT Domain Model before (Fig. 12.16).
The sensing service ‘ObjectInventoryServiceOPtable’ exposes the Resource
RFIDInventoryOperationTable hosted on the Sensor that observes the area
OperationTable during the operation. The duration is determined by the
Op123Schedule. The output of the service is described in a domain specific
operation-ontology by the class ListOfRFID that defines a list of identifiers the
RFID reader has detected. The service can be invoked by accessing the service
endpoint objInventoryOPtableRestSE that provides a RESTful web service on the
endpoint host optablehost. An HTTP GET method call on port 4355 on the root path
‘/’ of this host will return the list of identifiers the RFID sensor has read.
Fig. 12.14 Functional view of the MUNICH platform
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Fig. 12.15 Information model of MUNICH platform
Fig. 12.16 Service description MUNICH platform
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The use case is driven by events using asynchronous communication. Events are
sent to the Event History network resource every time an RFID reader recognises a
change in the number of RFID-tags in its observation area by using IoT Service
storeEvent(event). The Event History resource provides another IoT Service that
allows the subscription to notifications about the change in the status of towels,
e.g. from unused to in use.
The structure of an Event data type is given as follows:
• Origin: {RFID reader instrument table; RFID reader operation table; RFID
reader waste bin}
• Type: {RFID tag gone; RFID tag added; unrecognised tag}
• Time stamp
The sequence diagram below illustrates the interactions between Physical
Entities and Functional Components of the architecture. The doctor takes a new
towel out of the box on the instrument table and uses it in the patient’s abdomen
located on the operation table. The system detects the move of the towel from the
instrument to the operation table by the disappearance of the respective RFID tag
that is attached to the towel together with the appearance of the same RFID tag on
the operation table. The Event Storage Service evaluates these single events towel
disappeared on instrument table and towel appeared on operation table to a complex
event towel in use (Fig. 12.17).
12.6.10 MUNICH Platform Conclusion
The previous Sections have shown that an existing system can be reverse
engineered by applying the IoT ARM. Beginning from an existing system the
modelling of the IoT Domain Model and Information Model has been
demonstrated. With the help of these models the respective IoT Service
Descriptions have been derived and the interactions between the Resources have
been specified. The exercise did not include all the steps of the process to derive a
concrete architecture based on the IoT ARM. There was neither a requirements
analysis nor a security risk analysis undertaken. The purpose of this exercise is to
demonstrate the usage of the models in first place. Since the functionality of the
system has not changed a comprehensive requirements analysis has been skipped.
Also the security risks are seen as manageable since the operating theatre is a well-
secured and closed environment anyways. Only the event related service makes
connections to external environments, but that was the case for the original system
already and therefore no changes in security risks are expected. Particular platforms
and solutions to implement the use case are not recommended here; technologies
that would be suggested in this document might be outdated by the time of reading
this document and therefore obsolete.
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12.7 Conclusions About Reverse Mapping
In this Section we have provided a reverse mapping of the IoT Architectural
Reference Model with several standards from the field of IoT as well as a concrete
architecture in order to provide an architectural validation, namely whether it is
possible to map existing standards to the IoT ARM. If this was not possible, then the
validity of the ARM itself would be questionable.
As we have seen in the detailed discussion of the different standards, whether a
mapping is possible or not largely depends on the level of detail that we apply to the
mapping. Especially for the Domain Model this becomes clear when we pick up the
concept of a “Service”: All the standards we looked at provide services in one way
or the other, so that at a superficial glance a mapping is trivial. However, when we
take the exact definition of that term in the different standards, we realize that there
is not always a 1:1 correspondence between the standards. For instance, in ETSI
M2M a service is not defined as “exposing resources on devices, but can interact
with the devices.” A resource concept as in IoT-A does not exist, so that compared
to the definition of services and resources in the ARM, the distinction between a
resource and the service as it is made in IoT-A does not exist in ETSI M2M. From a
high-level perspective, though, the Domain Model usually maps rather well to the
different standards. Also, the Communication Model and security aspects are rather
compatible between the standards and the ARM. The latter is not surprising, as
security aspects in the world of IoT are commonly derived from a well-established
body of security research with fixed and clear terminology, quite unlike the Internet
of Things domain. Also, it must be noted that the scope of IoT-A is broader than the
scope of any of the individual standards. This is not surprising, as IoT-A aims to
provide a Reference Architecture for all different kinds of specific architectures and
use cases, and therefore must be broader by definition. Different parts of the IoT
ARM are therefore only partially or not covered at all by different standards. For
Fig. 12.17 Interactions MUNICH platform
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instance, EPCglobal is highly RFID centric and therefore neglects certain aspects
such as the IoT Communication Model, however the mapping to the IoT Domain
Model and also to the Security and Information Model works reasonably well at the
appropriate level of abstraction.
While the mapping of the different standards can be regarded as successful,
when being performed at the appropriate level of detail, the real litmus test is the
mapping of a concrete architecture to the IoT ARM. We have provided such a
mapping for the MUNICH platform and have provided detailed information about
the Domain Model, the Information Model, a process modelling based on the
BPMN extensions developed in IoT-A (Meyer et al. 2013) and have discussed the
service modelling in detail. Of course, we cannot generalize this successful exercise
to any existing concrete architecture, but it still demonstrates nicely, how the IoT
ARM can be applied to a concrete architecture. We are confident that other
architectures from the domain of IoT map equally well to the IoT ARM.
12.8 Business Case Evaluation Example
12.8.1 Introduction
In the healthcare use case, to show the real-world value of the ARM, we focus on an
IoT system that has already been implemented. In combination with the reverse
mapping (see Sect. 12.6), we show that not only can the IoT ARM describe existing
IoT systems (and by extension, help realise such systems), but that these systems
also bring value. We evaluated the operating efficiency and profitability of such an
IoT system.
This use case was implemented and carried out by several companies and
universities in the framework for the Initiative for Cloud Computing in Health
Care (henceforth referred to as the “MUNICH platform”). The MUNICH platform
addresses two main problems: debris left in the human body after surgery and time-
consuming process steps with no added value (“non-productive time”). A third
auxiliary problem is the on-going integration of software and solutions from third
party providers, which the IoT-A ARM would address.
Regarding the debris problem, in spite of safety checks already implemented,
debris (tools, towels, consumables) is still left in the body during surgical
procedures in 1:10,000 cases (Kranzfelder et al. 2012). In these cases, 70 % of
the debris comes from surgical towels and 30 % from other surgical equipment
(Kranzfelder et al. 2012). The consequences for the patient are a 40 % morbidity
rate with a 5 % mortality rate (Kranzfelder et al. 2012). Regarding non-productive
time, this refers to steps such as documenting and registering towels before the
operation, subsequent counting of towels during the operation, and searching for
towels when something is amiss; none of these steps add value, but instead address
a problem created by the process itself.
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Accordingly, a solution that addresses the tracking of surgical towels would
mitigate these problems significantly. We can therefore map the MUNICH
platform’s objectives and solutions as shown in Fig. 12.18.
Real-time monitoring and location of all towels reduces the risk of debris in the
human body because manual error-prone counting and searching is avoided
(MUWS 2013). Therefore, the automation reduces manual errors. The process
improvement increases the transparency of the process and reduces the risk of
documentation errors that can also lead to debris in the human body. Experts
estimate that a 100 % failure protection is possible with this solution (Kranzfelder
et al. 2012). Addressing the debris problem meets short-term objectives of automa-
tion and improved process effectiveness, and in the mid-term, increases patient
safety.
For the non-productive time problem, automation and the resultant process
improvement remove the error-prone steps of documenting and registering towels
before the operation, subsequent counting of towels during the operation, and
searching for towels when something is amiss.
For the long-term problem of integrating new software developments from the
hospital and their third party solution providers, the IoT-A ARM provides a
standardised reference architecture. This would simplify the complexity of the
architecture and make integration of new components into the system easier.
12.8.2 Cost and Benefit Models
The inputs for our analysis consisted of a cost model and a benefit model. The cost
model factored in non-recurring costs (NRC) such as the RFID antenna and readers.
The main cost driver is the hardware investment for the RFID antennas, which
amounts to €49,500 – 58 % of the total non-recurring cost (€85,600). Beyond this
initial investment, the cost model also factored in recurring costs (RC), such as the
RFID-tagged towels, the software and system licensing fee, staff training, and the
maintenance costs. The main cost driver of the recurring cost group is the operating
fees of the system provider. This cost element has the most significant impact on the
Fig. 12.18 Objectives of the healthcare use case and the problems addressed
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cost model and accounts for 98 % of the yearly RC of €1,034,000. A price change in
the service fee has a dramatic impact on the total cost structure over time. There-
fore, this price change will be part of a specific sensitivity analysis.
The total cost (NRC+RC) development over a 6 year period was subsequently
computed and input into a combined cost-benefit model (see 0 Cost-benefit
analysis).
The benefit model is composed of three benefits; the calculated yearly benefits
are in brackets: RFID-supported surgery (€815,000), cost savings from prevention
of surgical errors (€370,000), and RFID-supported surgery preparation (€104,000).
The “RFID-supported surgery” model provided the highest benefit, accounting for
63 % of total benefits. Non-tangible benefits not directly linked to a monetary
outcome include an increase in surgical scheduling each year due to reduced
preparation time, and hospital reputation improvements due to improved safety.
The total benefit over a 6 year period was subsequently computed and input into
a combined cost-benefit model (see 0 Cost-benefit analysis).
12.8.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Figure 12.19 presents the yearly and cumulative cash flows. The cost-benefit
analysis demonstrates a positive investment result. The discount factor is assumed
at 8 % and the net present value is €805,000. The payback period is less than 1 year.
Within Germany, according to healthcare experts, this would meet the requirement
of a 1 year payback period for new investments in a German hospital.
12.8.4 Sensitivity Analysis
With the sensitivity analysis, we can investigate the impact of changing the major
calculation variables. The following impacts shown in Table 12.6 will be discussed:
The results of the sensitivities are always evaluated with respect to the final
effect on the discounted cumulative cash flow. The sensitivity analysis will be
summarized with a best/worst case scenario.
12.8.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Cost Model
The cost model sensitivity analysis investigates the impacts on the cost model if a
parameter is changed. Reducing the critical risk factors (CRF) by 10 % leads to an
increase in the total cash flow from €805,000 to €1,187,000, which is an increase in
the net present value of 47 %. On the other hand, increasing the CRF by +10 % or
+20 % due to higher NRC and RC lowers the net present value to €423,000 or
€41,000 respectively.
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The main cost driver for recurring costs (RC) is the system service fee. An
increase of 10 % in the service fee per surgery from €20 to €22 reduces the net
present value by two thirds to €270,000. The profitability limit is reached by
increasing the fee to €23/surgery. The cost model sensitivity analysis is depicted
in Fig. 12.20.
Fig. 12.19 Cost-benefit analysis over the business case timeframe (healthcare case)
Table 12.6 Models and parameters varied in the sensitivity analysis for the healthcare case
Model element changed




Critical risk factors: Benefit variation factor
(BSF)
Discount Rate (DF)
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12.8.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis Regarding Benefit Model Robustness
This analysis aims to investigate the robustness of the benefit model and the impact
on the cost-benefit results. To demonstrate the development of the model, three
different scenarios are simulated: (1) Benefits increase by 10 % (2) Benefits
decrease by 10 % and (3) Benefits decrease by 15 %. The results of these
simulations are summarized in Fig. 12.21. The net present value is exactly
0 when the benefits are reduced by 12.4 %.
Notably, the net present value is very sensitive to changes in the benefit model;
there are large benefit differences between (1) and (2).
12.8.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis for the Assumptions in the General
Calculation
After the sensitivity analysis of costs and benefits variations, the analysis is
extended to variations of the general calculation assumptions that affect both
models. Two parameters are used to simulate the results. The first is the change
in the discount rate (DF) to reflect different risk perceptions and interest rate
influences. The second parameter concerns the frequency of the surgeries per
year (TAoS), which is a basic quantity variable (see Fig. 12.22).
A variation in the discount rate of 2 % leads to an increase/decrease in the net
present value of4 %. If a 12 % discount rate is assumed, the net present value falls
to €741,000 (8 %).
If the hospital performs 25 % fewer surgeries per year, the net present value
decreases to €524,000 (35 %). In contrast, if the number of surgeries per year
increases by 25 %, the net present value rises by 35 % (€1,087,000). The net present
value is zero if the hospital performs 71.5 % fewer surgeries per year.
Fig. 12.20 Cost model sensitivity analysis (healthcare case)
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12.8.4.4 Best/Worst Case Scenario
By combining cost and benefit variation in the sensitivity analysis, best and worst
case scenarios can be elaborated. For example, if the system service cost is reduced
by €1/surgery (¼ 5 %) and the hospital performs 25 % more surgeries annually,
then the net present value rises significantly to €1,421,000 (+77 %). The best case
scenario is based on the assumption that the service provider can lower the cost of
the service fee due to cheaper maintenance costs, additional development support
Fig. 12.21 Benefit model sensitivity analysis (healthcare case)
Fig. 12.22 Cost-benefit sensitivity analysis (healthcare case)
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from using the IoT ARM, and from economies of scale effects. As a result of using
the system and thereby reducing the errors, it is assumed that the hospital gains a
better reputation and is more efficient, and accordingly, the number of surgeries per
year rises.
In a worst case scenario it is assumed that the benefits are lowered by 5 %, the
system service fee is €2/surgery more expensive (+10 %), and the number of the
surgeries is reduced by 25 %. In this worst case scenario, the net present value is
completely destroyed and always negative (see Fig. 12.23).
We observe that the economic feasibility of the case depends to a high degree on
the system service fee of the service provider. The feasibility is also sensitive to
fluctuations in the benefits. Further investigation about the reliability of the cost
estimates is necessary. This information can be gained from the pilot deployments
of the system with RFID-equipped towels. A test case is currently running in
Munich at the university hospital “Rechts der Isar”. When the pilot case is finished,
a more reliable assessment of cost and benefits will be possible. The service
provider would then also have better information for the calculation of the cost of
the service fee.
Fig. 12.23 Best and worst case scenario (healthcare case)
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